Menachem Mendel

Sergey Dolgopolski, the author of What Is Talmud?: The Art of Disagreement, has a new book on the Talmud, The Open Past: Subjectivity and Remembering in the Talmud.

If life in time is imminent and means an always open future, what role remains for the past? If time originates from that relationship to the future, then the past can only be a fictitious beginning, a necessary phantom of a starting point, a retroactively generated chronological period of “before.” Advanced in philosophical thought of the last two centuries, this view of the past permeated the study on the Talmud as well, resulting in application of modern philosophical categories of the “thinking subject”, subjectivity, and time to thinking about thinking displayed in the texts of the Talmud. This book challenges that application. Departing from the hitherto prevalent view of thinking in the Talmud in terms of anonymous thinking subjects, called “redactors” or “designer” of Talmudic discussions, the book reconsiders the modern reduction of the past to a chronological period in time, and reclaims the originary power (and authority) the past exerts in thinking and remembering displayed both in the conversations the characters in the Talmud have, and in the literary design of these conversations. Central for that task of reclaiming the radical role of the past are contrasting medieval notions of the virtual and their modern appropriations, thinking subject among them, which serve as both a bridging point and a demarcation between the practices of thinking of, and remembering, the past in the Talmud vis-a-vis other rhetorical and/or philosophical school and disciplines of thought.

The Open Past suggests the possibility of understanding the conversations and the design of these conversations in the Talmud in terms of thinking in no time. This no time has several layers of meaning. In its weakest formulation, it means “in no single time” in the sense that the Talmudic conversations happen in no historically “real” time. More strongly put, it means, borrowing the language from film theory, that the Talmud requires a never consolidated difference between diegetical time, and the time of montage; which creates a no-one’s time and place that in turn creates time and place for everyone else. Even more strongly, it means that performance of the conversations in the Talmud is constantly driven by, and towards, an always open past — a power of that past is radically different from the power of either futuristic or chronological time.

May 22nd, 2013 | Category: New Books, Talmud, Talmud Study | Leave a comment

Ruth Calderon used to have a show on Israeli TV called החדר. The shows featured Calderon and a guest or two who addressed issues relating to Judaism and Jewish culture, Zionism, Jewish texts, and Israeli culture. Archived videos of the program can be found here. Below is an episode that discussed Bave Metzia 84a, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish.

May 22nd, 2013 | Category: Israeli Culture, Israeli History, Religion in Israel, Zionism | Leave a comment

Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice had a tremendous influence on our understanding of gender and morality, even as some disagree with her theories. This is how one website summarized her findings:

In the book, Gilligan outlined her findings on female moral development and decision-making, drawing on studies with children and university students. In Kohlberg’s classic studies, females appeared to be deficient in moral reasoning when compared to similarly aged males. This was true of both children and adults. However, Gilligan had noticed a problem – Kohlberg’s early work in developing his moral stage theory was based on studies with only white male participants. In light of this, she began working with female participants facing a personally and politically charged dilemma: whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. The results of her study indicated that women were not deficient at all – they were simply using a style of moral reasoning that was not being captured by Kohlberg’s assessment methods. As such, they did not fit within his theory, and their voices were not registering. Instead, Gilligan suggested that the women she interviewed used an ethic of care – their morality was based around care for others rather than appeals to seemingly universal codes of behaviour. She believed that this ethic of care was not inherently limited to females, but it was certainly more common among her female participants. Therefore, the ethic of care was not designed to replace Kohlberg’s theory of morality, but rather to complement it. In fact, Gilligan has consistently argued that she would like to see psychology “free itself, both in theory and in methods, from the gender binary and the gender hierarchy.”

Steven F. Friedell has written an article about Gilligan’s theories and Jewish Law, The ‘Different Voice’ in Jewish Law – Some Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudence.

The article explore several parallels between features of Jewish law and a type of feminist jurisprudence that has been inspired by the work of Carol Gilligan. For example, Jewish law emphasizes compromise, an avoidance of formal claims, a concern for victims that transcends mere compensation. It recognizes the primacy of duties, not rights, it seeks to avoid formal rules, insists that judges be sensitive to the difficulties of life and that judges must use their intuition as well as their reason. Jewish law discouraged the use of lawyers, preferring that parties work out their own disputes. It favored a controlled market to limit the damage done by competition and imposed a duty to rescue. Jewish law views peace as the ultimate goal.

As an aside, I would like to point out that while we often hear about academics boycotting Israel, Gilligan has been a very strong supporter of Israel, collaborating with Israeli academics and often speaking in Israel, she even has a son who served in Golani.

May 21st, 2013 | Category: Gender, Halakhic Literature, Jewish Law, Legal History, Legal Theory | Comments (1)

Rabbi Len Levin has posted online an article of his titled “Is the ‘Halakhic Authenticity’ of Conservative Judaism a Broken Myth?” Here are some of his conclusions:

But for Kaplanians and Heschelians alike, affirming the halakhic seriousness of Conservative Judaism is (I here disagree with my teacher Rabbi Gillman) not just the equivalent of “Hooray for Conservative Judaism!” but is an affirmation with serious content. It affirms the following:
1. Law is an important resource in giving shape to our otherwise chaotic existence. An unenforced and imperfectly-kept law may doubtfully deserve the name of “law” at all, but we are better off continuing to affirm it as such and to strive for its implementation, than if we abandoned the attempt. It is the way we know best to articulate our aspirations in concrete, achievable form.
2. Law may not be specified verbally by God, but it is at least a human expression of the divine will, and maybe more.
3. Tradition may not be infallible, but it represents the accumulated experience of prior generations in their collective attempts to understand the divine will, and should be listened to with all seriousness.
4. Consensus is never absolutely achievable, but insofar as we can achieve it, it is an indispensable prerequisite to our continued group existence as Jews. Law and tradition are essential aids to this consensus.
5. The Written Torah and Talmudic tradition may not be infallible, but they are the bedrock of our collective existence and the basis of whatever consensus we may hope to achieve as Jews, and so should be overruled only where absolutely necessary.
6. Precedent is the basis of our continuity but not to be slavishly followed. Our intelligent, articulated disagreement with precedent is also a form of continuity (on Ronald Dworkin’s model of “the next chapter to be written in the book”).
7. Law and its underlying reasons are two sides of the same coin.[14] In analyzing law for its reasons we discover the values inherent in it; in translating our own values into new law, we give them a form in which they can be the next chapter in the tradition.

May 19th, 2013 | Category: Conservative Judaism, Jewish Law, Jewish Thought | Comments (2)

NRG is reporting (Hebrew) on a new halakhic ruling that is found in the newest issue of Teḥumin. Rabbi Eliyahu Abergil of the Jerusalem Beit Din is cited as saying that:

A person who is aware of the severe damage that is caused by smoking cigarettes, and continues to do this, transgresses the prohibition of “Take care of yourself” (Deut. 4:9) and “Now you are to take exceeding care for your selves” (Deut. 4:15).

A person who knowingly transgresses these Biblical prohibitions is prohibited from serving as a witness.
For a previous pesak of Rabbi Abergil see here.

May 19th, 2013 | Category: Jewish Law | Comments (1)

[The following post is a revision of two posts from six years ago.]

Followers of Daf Yomi recently read one of the most important Talmudic sources that addresses the question of a Shabbes Goy, i.e. a non-Jew who performs an act on behalf of a Jew that is prohibited for a Jew to do. On Eruvin 67b-68a we read about a circumcision that was taking place on Shabbat and as was customary in the rabbinic period, warm water was prepared for the baby to be used after the circumcision (see Mishnah Shabbat 9:3).

ההוא ינוקא דאשתפיך חמימיה אמר להו רבה נייתו ליה חמימי מגו ביתאי א”ל אביי והא לא ערבינן א”ל נסמוך אשיתוף א”ל הא לא שתפינן נימרו ליה לנכרי ליתי ליה אמר אביי בעי לאותביה למר ולא שבקן רב יוסף דאמר רב [יוסף אמר רב] כהנא כי הוינן בי רב יהודה הוה אמר לן בדאורייתא מותבינן תיובתא והדר עבדינן מעשה בדרבנן עבדינן מעשה והדר מותבינן תיובתא לבתר הכי אמר ליה מאי בעית לאותביה למר אמר [ליה דתניא] הזאה שבות ואמירה לנכרי שבות מה הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת אף אמירה לנכרי שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת א”ל ולא שני לך בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה

There was once a child whose warm water was spilled. Rabbah said to them, “Let some warm water be brought for him from my house.” Abbayeh said to him, “We haven’t prepared an eruv [that would allow carrying].” [Rabbah] said to him, “Let us rely upon shittuf (joining of alleyways that would allow carrying).” [Abbayeh] said to him, “We haven’t prepared a shittuf.” [Rabbah said,] “Let us say to a non-Jew to bring it for him.” Abbayeh [later] said, “I wanted to respond to Master [i.e. Rabbah] but R. Yosef would not let me, since R. Yosef quoted R. Kahanah as saying, “When we were at R. Yehudah’s house he would say to us ‘In a matter of Biblical law we respond with an objection before the ruling is acted upon, in a matter of rabbinic law we act upon it and only later respond with an objection.’” Afterwards [R. Yosef] said to [Abbayeh], “What did you want to respond to Master?” [Abbayeh] said to him, it is taught: Sprinkling is a shevut [i.e. a rabbinic prohibition] and asking a non-Jew [to do work on Shabbat] is a shevut. Just as sprinkling on Shabbat is prohibited and does not supersede Shabbat, so asking a non-Jew to do something on Shabbat, as a rabbinic prohibition, is prohibited and does not supersede Shabbat. [R. Yosef] said to [Abbayeh], “Don’t you draw a distinction between a rabbinic prohibition that involves an act (ma’aseh) and a rabbinic prohibition that does not involve an act?

The conclusion of the Talmudic discussion seems to be that at least in the case of a circumcision when the performance of a mitzvah is involved, one is allowed to ask a non-Jew to perform an act which is prohibited for a Jew to do on Shabbat. There also seems to be no necessary limitation on what type of act a non-Jew can be asked to do. The above text was based upon the Oxford manuscript of the Talmud, but in one of the Vatican manuscripts and in later printed editions, including the Vilna edition, there is an additional line added at the end (also see Dikdukei Soferim, אות ע). The additional line is: דהא מר לא אמר לנכרי זיל אחים (“For Master surely did not tell the non-Jew to go and heat water.”). The implication of this added line is that while it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform an act forbidden to a Jew, this is limited to actions which are only Rabbinically prohibited. Thus, asking a non-Jew to “heat water” which is Biblically prohibited, would not have been permitted. From this example we see how a variant reading has large implications as to the halakhic conclusion which can be drawn from a Talmudic discussion.

The implication of whether this additional line was present was discussed by the Rishonim. In Halakhot Gedolot we read the following:

והיכא דאייתי אוזמיל ממעלי שבתא ובשבתא איגניב או איפגים אי מקמי מילה שרי למימר לגוי לצבותיה או לאיתויי אוזמיל אחרינא כי ההוא ינוקא דאשתפיך חמימיה אמ’ רבא לייתו ליה מגו ביתא אמ’ ליה אביי והא לא עריבו נסמוך אשיתוף והא לא שתיפו לימרו ליה לגוי לייתי ליה אמ’ אביי בעי לאותביה למר ולא שבקן רב יוסף דאמ’ רב כהנא כי הוינן בי רב יהודה אמ’ לן בדאוריתא מותבינן תיובתא והדר עבדינן מעשה בדרבנן עבדינן מעשה והדר מותבינן תיובתא בתר הכי אמ’ ליה מאי בעית לאותביה דתניא הזאה שבות ואמירה לגוי שבות מה הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת אף אמירה לגוי שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת אמ’ ליה ולא שני לך בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה דהא מר לא אמ’ ליה זיל אחים ליה

(204 מה’ הילדסהיימר, ירושלים, ח”א, עמ’)

The important comments of Halachot Gedolot to the Talmudic sugyah are that one is able to say to a non-Jew on Shabbat “לצבותיה או לאיתויי אוזמיל אחרינא” (“to repair or to bring another knife,” see Sokoloff’s dictionary on p. 951). If one of the important questions to be asked is what category of prohibition, Biblical or Rabbinic, one allowed to ask a non-Jew to do, it must be determined as into what category of prohibition, Biblical or Rabbinic, “to repair or to bring another knife” falls. The Rif interprets HG as permitting a Jew to ask a non-Jew to perform a Biblically prohibited act. He assumes that repairing is Biblically prohibited, maybe as “sharpening” (see Beitza 28a) and interprets “bringing” as referring to via the public domain (רשות הרבים). He says that the words of HG are not to be relied upon because from the Talmudic discussion itself one sees that it is prohibited to ask a non-Jew to perform a Biblically prohibited act. The following is from the Rif on Shabbat, chap. 19, par. 504, 56 in ed. Vilna and a translation can be found here.

כההוא ינוקא דאשתפיך חמימיה אמר להו רבה לייתו מגו ביתאי א”ל אביי והא לא עירבו א”ל נסמוך אשיתוף והא לא שתיף לימרו לנכרי ליזיל לייתי לי מגו ביתאי אמר ליה אביי בעאי לאותובי למר ולא שבקן רב יוסף דא”ר כהנא כי הוינן בי רב יהודה אמר לן בדאורייתא מותבינן תיובתא והדר עבדינן עובדא בדרבנן עבדינן עובדא והדר מותבינן תיובתא הדר אמר לו מאי בעית דתותביה א”ל מהא דתניא הזאה שבות היא ואמירה לנכרי שבות היא מה הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה שבת אף אמירה לנכרי שבות ואינה דוחה שבת א”ל ולא שני לך בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה דהא מר לא א”ל לנכרי זיל אחים לי דהוא מעשה דאסור מדאורייתא אלא זיל אייתי לי דלית ביה מעשה דידים אלא דיבורא בעלמא הוא ושתק ולא מצא תשובה ועיינינן בהו ואשכחן דלאו מילי דסמכא נינהו ומגופא דהאי עובדא ילפת דאסור למימר לנכרי לצבותיה או לאתויי דרך רה”ר מדקאמר ליה דהא מר לא א”ל זיל אחים לי מכלל דאסור למימר לנכרי זיל אחים לי וכמה מרבוואתא טעו בהאי פירושא דהאי מימרא דקסברי דהאי דא”ל ולא שני ליה למר בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה אשבות דהזאה קאמר ליה דשבות דהזאה שבות דאית ביה מעשה ושבות דאמירה לית ביה מעשה בידים דדיבורא בעלמא הוא ואקשו בה הכי ואמרי הואיל ואמירה לנכרי שבות דלית ביה מעשה הוא מה לי א”ל אייתי לי מגו ביתאי ומה לי א”ל זיל אחים לי תרוייהו שבות דלית בהו מעשה נינהו דדיבורא בעלמא הוא ושרי ואטעו לכולהו נוסחאי דגמרא דקסברי דליכא בגמרא דהא מר לא א”ל זיל אחים לי אלא טעותא דנוסחי הוא ולא כדקא סברי הוא ונוסחי לית בהו טעותא אלא נוסחי מעלייא נינהו ולא פירושי’ כדקא סברי להו אלא האי דא”ל ולא שני ליה למר בין שבות דאית ביה מעשה לשבות דלית ביה מעשה לאו אשבות דהזאה קאמר ליה אלא הכי קאמר ליה הא דאמרת אמירה לנכרי שבות וקא מדמיתו לה לשבות דהזאה דאסירא לא שני לך בשבות דאמירה גופה בין שבות דאית ביה מלאכה לשבות דלית ביה מלאכה דהא מר לא א”ל זיל אחים לי דאית ביה מלאכה אלא אייתי לי מגו ביתאי קאמר ליה דטלטול בעלמא הוא דלית ביה מלאכה דשמעת מינה דכי אמרינן אמירה לנכרי שבות בדבר שהוא מלאכה אבל בדבר שאינו מלאכה כגון האי לא אמרינן ביה אמירה לנכרי שבות הרי נתברר לך דליכא בנוסחאי טעותא ומילי דברירן אינון והאי דאמרי’ שבות דלית ביה מעשה ולא אמרינן שבות דלית ביה מלאכה מעשה ומלאכה בהאי ענינא חדא מילתא היא דקרו אינשי למלאכה מעשה כדאמרינן ובין יום השביעי לששת ימי המעשה והיינו מלאכה וכבר נתברר לך דאסור למימר לנכרי לצבותיה או לאתויי דרך רשות הרבים והאי דכתב בעל הלכות טעותא הוא ולא תסמוך עילויה:

The Rif goes to some length to explain why HG’s reading is incorrect, saying that he is mistaken and cannot be relied upon, and that many people misinterpret this (“וכמה מרבוואתא טעו בהאי פירושא”). If the Rif’s interpretation of HG is correct (see note 4 in ed. Hildesheimer for other Rishonim on this question), then one would expect that the HG should not read “דהא מר לא אמ’ ליה זיל אחים ליה” “For Master surely did not tell the non-Jew to go and heat water”, since it is this additional line that seems to force one into the position of only being allowed to ask a non-Jew to perform a Rabbinically prohibited act, yet the only edition of HG which Hildesheimer cites that does not include this line is the Warsaw printed edition.

These questions require more investigation, including looking into the versions of HG found in the Cairo Geniza and other versions of the Rif.

May 19th, 2013 | Category: Daf Yomi, Jewish-Gentile Relations, Talmud, Talmud Study | Leave a comment

Midreshet Lindenbaum recently dedicated what some claim to be the largest Beit Midrash in yeshiva dedicated to study by women. NRG reports (Hebrew) that in addition to the new Beit Midrash there are intentions that in two years they will have a program for women to learn dayyanut, a high-level of learning that would qualify women to serve on a beit din (court).

May 19th, 2013 | Category: Gender, Jewish Law, Talmud Study, Talmud Torah | Leave a comment

There is an interview (Hebrew) on the website Kipa with MK Ruth Calderon. Here is one snippet.

…Talmud is a project unlike any other. It is a sort of frozen product that you reheat anew. It is the frozen food of intellectuals, of people who love wisdom more than the bottom line. Talmud is not practical like the Shulhan Arukh, rather, it discusses deep questions like for example what is money, what is charity. This is enticing. The sages of the Talmud and the Mishnah are incredible people with opinions that are unconventional, revolutionary, and sometimes radical. In the Talmud you enter into the dialogue of interesting people and you pay attention with pleasure. Beyond this, it is the Hebrew and the Aramaic, languages in whose depths we live. Every word fills your mouth with tastes. I am currently learning Tractate Bikkurim about the obligation to be seen [in Jerusalem]. Whoever loves culture is unable to withstand this. Another thing, the editing is incredible. This is not like a Western book, rather, it is like One Thousand and One Nights. It is possible to start on any page, this is appropriate for my [way of] thinking.

The interview has many more interesting things about Talmud study. Ḥag Sameaḥ.

May 13th, 2013 | Category: Rabbinic Authority, Religion in Israel, Talmud, Talmud Study, Talmud Torah | Comments (2)

The video of is from a lecture at the Library of Congress. Hat tip goes to Alfonso de Zamora on Twitter.

May 13th, 2013 | Category: Hebrew Literature, Hebrew Printing | Leave a comment