Report on the Fordham Conference on Jewish Law-2010
On Monday I was able to attend the Fordham Conference on Jewish Law (see here) and I wanted to post a few comments on it. First of all, yishar koach to all of the organizers. While I was only able to be there for one day, it was well worth the effort. Here are a few notes that I took on some of the presentations
Calum Carmichael spoke about the relationship between the Judah and Tamar story and the laws of the nazirite. He emphasized that biblical law grew out of narrative and not out of societal reality, something which he has written about extensively. See this review of one of his books for a discussion of this approach.
Ron Kleiman presented an interesting paper on “Transfer of Ownership in E-Commerce: Transactions in Jewish, American, and Israeli Law.” He tried to address the question of when does an individual gain ownership of an item that they buy online. From his presentation it became clear that it is not a simple question to answer. Is ownership acquired when one enters their credit card information? Delivery? According to Kleiman, in Jewish law E-commerce is not based upon kinyan, acquisition of ownership, but rather on a contractual obligation.
Jonathan Milgram introduced his current research on Jewish Inheritance Law, explaining how he has come to different conclusions than Reuven Yaron in his classic book Gifts in Contemplation of Death in Jewish & Roman law. Milgram explained how some of the situations in which he came to different conclusions than Yaron are based upon newer methods of examining Tannaitic literature which were not at Yaron’s disposal when he wrote his book.
Yuval Sinai attempted to demonstrate that the Babylonian and Palestinian sages exhibited different attitudes towards the obligation to judge and the status of the judge him/herself. Sinai understands the Palestinian sages projected legal passivity while those of Babylonia supported a greater role for judges, with some understanding it to be a religious duty. One example that he brought, which was contested by someone in the audience, is that of אין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות, “A judge only has what their eyes see.” According to Sinai the Palestinian sages understood this term to be an acknowledgement after the fact of dispensation from punishment in the case of an erroneous opinion. On the other hand, Babylonian sages understood this to mean that the judge had a great amount of legal discretion. Two sources that he brought compared were y. Sanhedrin 1:9 and b. Baba Batra 30b.
Ilan Fuchs spoke on the way in which women in judicial roles has been interpreted by numerous halakkists. He tried to answer the question why certain halakhists who exhibited flexibility and leniency in certain circumstances, suddenly wouldn’t budge when it came to woman as judges. Fuchs understood their opposition to be grounded in the symbolic power of a woman as a judge. The symbolic power was more important than the purely legal question. For an example of the interesting research that Fuchs is doing, see his article, ‘Sephardic’ Halakhah? The Attitude of Sephardic Decisors to Women’s Torah Study: A Test Case .